vaayaa Inclusive Education
Healthcare risk assessment

General, Trauma and Critical Care Surgery Risk Assessment: Patient Safety, Continuity and Controls

A worked example of how a surgical service identifies, scores and controls the risks that threaten patient safety, operating room continuity, staff competence and trust across general, trauma and critical care surgery.

Updated November 2026 8 hazards assessed Review every 3 months Highest risk: Critical to High
See the General, Trauma and Critical Care Surgery course

Executive summary

This assessment shows how a surgical service can find, rate and control the risks that matter most to patients undergoing general, trauma and critical care surgery. Eight risks were chosen because they are plausible in everyday operating room, ward and critical care work. Missed deterioration and fatigue carry the highest inherent scores, because they can turn a manageable problem into a critical one. Wrong site events and major hemorrhage have a lower chance but a severe impact, so their controls focus on checks and rehearsal. Each risk is scored before controls and again after existing and proposed controls. Most fall to Medium or Low after controls, while fatigue and competence remain High because staffing pressure is hard to remove. The first actions are a structured pause for every case, a clear escalation route on the wards, a second source for critical supplies and a limit on consecutive long shifts. The scores are a teaching example and do not describe any real service.

Focus area
General, trauma and critical care surgery
Setting
Hospital surgical service with operating rooms, a surgical ward, a critical care unit and a trauma receiving pathway
Method
Five by five likelihood and impact clinical risk register

Scope

This assessment covers the surgical pathway from referral and consent through the operating room, recovery, the surgical ward and critical care, including handover between teams. It looks at risks to patient safety, service continuity, staff competence, blood and consumable supply, clinical records and public trust. It does not give clinical instruction for any patient or procedure. Jurisdiction, hospital size, staffing model and electronic record system are assumptions made for teaching.

Context

The service has several operating rooms, a general surgical ward, a critical care unit and a trauma receiving route that brings urgent cases in at any hour. Teams include consultant surgeons, trainee doctors, anesthetists, operating room nurses, ward and critical care nurses, a trauma coordinator, pharmacy, the blood bank, sterile services, procurement and information technology staff. Clinical records are kept electronically with paper downtime packs. Each risk is scored before controls to show its natural level, then again after the existing controls and the additional controls that are proposed. The scores guide attention and do not replace clinical judgment.

Objectives, assets and stakeholders

The objective is to deliver safe operations and critical care, keep waiting times reasonable, protect patient records and supplies, and maintain the trust of patients, families, referring clinicians and regulators. The assets in scope are patients, operating rooms, critical care beds, blood and consumable stock, clinical records and the skills of the surgical workforce. Stakeholders include patients and their families, surgeons, anesthetists, nurses, trainee doctors, the blood bank, sterile services, procurement, information governance staff, the hospital board and the regulator. Every risk has one owner role, and the clinical director of surgery reviews the register with the governance group each quarter.

Risk matrix: before and after controls

Each cell shows hazard numbers placed by likelihood and impact. Compare the two grids to see how controls move each hazard.

Before controls

Inherent risk

Risk before controls: rows are likelihood from almost certain to rare, columns are impact from insignificant to catastrophic. Cells list hazard numbers.
1
Insignificant
2
Minor
3
Moderate
4
Major
5
Catastrophic
5 Almost certain
4 Likely Likelihood 4, impact 2, score 8, medium: H05 Likelihood 4, impact 3, score 12, high: H01 Likelihood 4, impact 4, score 16, high: H02 Likelihood 4, impact 5, score 20, critical: H07
3 Possible Likelihood 3, impact 3, score 9, medium: H06 Likelihood 3, impact 4, score 12, high: H08
2 Unlikely Likelihood 2, impact 5, score 10, high: H03 H04
1 Rare

After controls

Residual risk

Risk after controls: rows are likelihood from almost certain to rare, columns are impact from insignificant to catastrophic. Cells list hazard numbers.
1
Insignificant
2
Minor
3
Moderate
4
Major
5
Catastrophic
5 Almost certain
4 Likely
3 Possible Likelihood 3, impact 2, score 6, medium: H05 Likelihood 3, impact 4, score 12, high: H07
2 Unlikely Likelihood 2, impact 2, score 4, low: H06 Likelihood 2, impact 3, score 6, medium: H01 H08 Likelihood 2, impact 4, score 8, medium: H02 H04
1 Rare Likelihood 1, impact 5, score 5, medium: H03
  • Low 1 to 4
  • Medium 5 to 9
  • High 10 to 16
  • Critical 17 to 25

Hazard register

A summary first, then the detail for each hazard.

Summary of hazards with scores before and after controls
No.HazardBeforeAfterOwner
H01 Surgical site infection and retained items 12 High 6 Medium Theatre manager
H02 Missed deterioration on the ward and in critical care 16 High 8 Medium Head of nursing
H03 Wrong site, wrong procedure or consent gap 10 High 5 Medium Consultant surgeon lead
H04 Major hemorrhage and delayed blood product supply 10 High 8 Medium Lead anesthetist
H05 Operating room scheduling and capacity failure 8 Medium 6 Medium Theatre manager
H06 Clinical record errors and inappropriate disclosure 9 Medium 4 Low Information governance lead
H07 Fatigue and competence gaps in surgical and trauma teams 20 Critical 12 High Clinical director of surgery
H08 Critical consumable and implant supply dependency 12 High 6 Medium Procurement lead
H01

Surgical site infection and retained items

Safety Before 12 After 6

Bacteria enter the surgical wound, or a swab, sponge or instrument is left inside the patient after surgery, causing infection, return to the operating room, a longer stay and harm. Counts are often incomplete when rooms are busy or staff change during a case.

Who or what is affected: Patients, operating room staff and ward teams

Causes

Interrupted counts, long cases, busy rooms and mid-procedure changes of staff.

Consequences

Wound infection, sepsis, reoperation and harm from a retained item.

Existing controls

  • Instrument and swab counts are performed and recorded at set points in each case.
  • Antibiotic prophylaxis and skin preparation follow the local protocol.

Control gaps

Counts rely partly on verbal confirmation and are not always recorded at closure.

Additional controls

  • Prevent: Standardize sterile technique checks and wound care bundles across all teams.
  • Detect: Audit counts and wound complications each month and review discrepancies at a safety huddle.
Likelihood 4 x impact 3 before; 2 x 3 after Owner: Theatre manager Target: Within 60 days Early warning: A count discrepancy, or a wound infection reported within 30 days of surgery.
H02

Missed deterioration on the ward and in critical care

Safety Before 16 After 8

A patient who is becoming unwell after surgery or trauma is not recognized early, because observations are late, scores are misread or escalation is delayed, so a treatable problem becomes a critical one.

Who or what is affected: Post-operative and trauma patients, ward nurses and critical care staff

Causes

High workload, unclear thresholds and reluctance to call for help.

Consequences

Cardiac arrest, organ failure, death and a serious incident review.

Existing controls

  • Early warning score charts are completed at set intervals.
  • Any staff member can request a senior or critical care review.

Control gaps

Escalation is informal and is not audited against observation records.

Additional controls

  • Prevent: Set clear escalation triggers and display the review route at each bedside.
  • Detect: Review missed or late observation sets each week and feed trends into ward huddles.
Likelihood 4 x impact 4 before; 2 x 4 after Owner: Head of nursing Target: Within 45 days Early warning: Observation sets overdue, or a score that rises without a documented review.
H03

Wrong site, wrong procedure or consent gap

Legal and compliance Before 10 After 5

The wrong side, level or patient is operated on, or the procedure goes ahead without a valid consent discussion, because checks are rushed or information is incomplete. Harm, complaint and legal challenge can follow.

Who or what is affected: Patients, surgeons, anesthetists and theatre teams

Causes

Rushed lists, last-minute changes and incomplete imaging or consent information.

Consequences

Serious harm, reoperation, complaint, legal claim and loss of trust.

Existing controls

  • Consent forms are signed before the operating list starts.
  • The operating surgeon marks the site before induction of anesthesia.

Control gaps

The pause is sometimes completed as a tick box rather than as a real check.

Additional controls

  • Prevent: Use a structured pause before incision in which each team member states the patient, site and procedure aloud.
  • Detect: Check the consent record against the list for every case and report any gap at the start of the day.
Likelihood 2 x impact 5 before; 1 x 5 after Owner: Consultant surgeon lead Target: Within 30 days Early warning: A list change made without a documented consent update.
H04

Major hemorrhage and delayed blood product supply

Safety Before 10 After 8

Unexpected bleeding during surgery or after trauma outpaces the available blood, plasma or clotting products, because stock is low, crossmatching is slow or the major hemorrhage route is not started early enough.

Who or what is affected: Patients, anesthetists, blood bank staff and theatre teams

Causes

Unpredictable bleeding, low stock after heavy use and slow communication with the blood bank.

Consequences

Shock, organ injury, death and cancelled operations.

Existing controls

  • Blood is crossmatched before major cases on the planned list.
  • A major hemorrhage protocol is available in the operating room and the emergency department.

Control gaps

Stock levels are not linked to forecasts of trauma activity.

Additional controls

  • Prevent: Agree minimum stock levels for key products and review usage against the trauma caseload.
  • Respond: Rehearse the hemorrhage protocol in simulation and record the time to the first products given.
Likelihood 2 x impact 5 before; 2 x 4 after Owner: Lead anesthetist Target: Within 30 days Early warning: Blood stock below the agreed floor for more than one day.
H05

Operating room scheduling and capacity failure

Operational Before 8 After 6

Lists overrun, rooms are double booked or emergency cases displace planned work, so patients wait longer, cancellations rise and staff are stretched across the day without relief.

Who or what is affected: Patients on waiting lists, surgeons, theatre staff and referring clinics

Causes

Unreliable turnaround, emergency cases without buffer time and equipment that is not ready.

Consequences

Longer waits, patient anxiety, lower throughput and staff burnout.

Existing controls

  • A weekly list plan is agreed by the surgical team.
  • Cancelled cases are recorded with a reason.

Control gaps

No buffer time is planned for emergency arrivals.

Additional controls

  • Prevent: Hold a daily planning huddle that reviews emergency cover and room use before the first case.
  • Detect: Track overruns and cancellations each week and compare them with the planned list.
Likelihood 4 x impact 2 before; 3 x 2 after Owner: Theatre manager Target: Within 90 days Early warning: Lists overrunning by more than the agreed margin on three or more days in a row.
H06

Clinical record errors and inappropriate disclosure

Technology and data Before 9 After 4

Results, medicine doses or consent details are recorded against the wrong patient, or records are viewed or shared without need, because access is broad, handover text is copied or a system outage forces paper workarounds.

Who or what is affected: Patients, clinicians, information governance staff and the public

Causes

Shared logins, copied handover text and paper workarounds during outages.

Consequences

Wrong treatment, a privacy breach, complaint and regulator involvement.

Existing controls

  • Staff sign in with individual accounts, and access is linked to role.
  • Patient identifiers are checked before medicines and samples are given or taken.

Control gaps

Access logs are not reviewed against staff roles.

Additional controls

  • Prevent: Remove access rights that are no longer needed and require a recorded reason for viewing records outside the care team.
  • Recover: Keep a downtime pack and reconcile paper entries into the record within a set period.
Likelihood 3 x impact 3 before; 2 x 2 after Owner: Information governance lead Target: Within 60 days Early warning: Records viewed by staff with no current link to the patient.
H07

Fatigue and competence gaps in surgical and trauma teams

People Before 20 After 12

Long shifts, on call duty and uneven training leave staff tired or less practiced in complex procedures and emergency decisions, so errors become more likely and team communication breaks down under pressure.

Who or what is affected: Patients, junior doctors, nurses and senior surgeons

Causes

Staffing shortfalls, long on call periods and training demands that compete with clinical service.

Consequences

Errors, staff sickness, resignations and serious incident reports.

Existing controls

  • Rotas are set so that on call shifts are followed by rest periods.
  • Competency sign off is recorded for named procedures and roles.

Control gaps

Fatigue is not measured, and competency sign off is out of date for some staff.

Additional controls

  • Prevent: Limit consecutive long shifts and the number of on call hours by agreement with the rota lead.
  • Detect: Review fatigue reports, near misses and training gaps at each governance meeting.
  • Respond: Provide a supported debrief after each major trauma case.
Likelihood 4 x impact 5 before; 3 x 4 after Owner: Clinical director of surgery Target: Within 90 days Early warning: Staff reporting more than the agreed number of consecutive long shifts.
H08

Critical consumable and implant supply dependency

Supplier Before 12 After 6

A single supplier fails, a product recall occurs or a key sterile item runs out, so planned operations are postponed or substitutes are used without proper evaluation.

Who or what is affected: Patients, theatre teams, procurement staff and suppliers

Causes

Single sourcing, long lead times and reliance on imported products.

Consequences

Cancelled surgery, unsafe substitutes, cost increases and reputational damage.

Existing controls

  • Par levels are set for the most used sterile items.
  • The preferred supplier list is reviewed each year.

Control gaps

Supplier resilience is not assessed against recall risk.

Additional controls

  • Prevent: Qualify a second source for critical items and keep a written substitution review process.
  • Detect: Monitor stock turnover and supplier delivery performance each week.
Likelihood 3 x impact 4 before; 2 x 3 after Owner: Procurement lead Target: Within 90 days Early warning: A critical item below par level for two or more consecutive days.

Rating method and evaluation

Each risk is rated on two five-point scales. Likelihood runs from Rare to Almost certain, and impact runs from Minimal to Catastrophic. Multiplying the two gives a score from 1 to 25, which falls into one of four bands: Low from 1 to 4, Medium from 5 to 9, High from 10 to 16 and Critical from 17 to 25. Inherent risk is the score before any controls are applied. Residual risk is the score after the existing controls and the additional controls are in place. Residual risk must never be higher than inherent risk. Impact is judged on harm to patients first, then on service continuity, cost, legal exposure and trust, and a risk is never rated down only because it has not yet happened. Critical and High risks need senior clinical attention and a dated plan, Medium risks need routine controls with a named owner, and Low risks are accepted and monitored. Ratings are challenged by the staff who do the work, through governance meetings and incident reviews, and are reopened whenever an indicator reaches its threshold or an incident occurs.

Likelihood, impact and rating bands

Likelihood

  • 5 Almost certain: Expected to happen in most circumstances.
  • 4 Likely: Will probably happen in many circumstances.
  • 3 Possible: Could happen at some time.
  • 2 Unlikely: Not expected, but it could happen.
  • 1 Rare: Only in exceptional circumstances.

Impact

  • 1 Insignificant: No lasting effect. Handled within routine work.
  • 2 Minor: Small effect that is quickly corrected.
  • 3 Moderate: Noticeable effect that needs managed effort to correct.
  • 4 Major: Serious effect on people, delivery or reputation.
  • 5 Catastrophic: Severe or lasting effect that threatens the whole activity.

Bands (likelihood x impact)

  • Low (1 to 4): Accept and monitor.
  • Medium (5 to 9): Manage with routine controls.
  • High (10 to 16): Senior attention and a treatment plan.
  • Critical (17 to 25): Act first. Do not proceed until reduced.

Monitoring, escalation and review

Review this assessment every 3 months, and sooner when an indicator below reaches its threshold.

Early-warning indicators and escalation thresholds
Indicator to watchEscalate when
Observation sets overdue, or early warning scores rising without a documented senior review.Escalate to the ward manager when two or more sets are overdue in one shift, and to the head of nursing when a score rises without review.
Cases where the consent record or site marking is not confirmed at the pause.Escalate to the consultant surgeon lead at once, and hold the case until the gap is closed.
Blood stock below the agreed floor, or a critical consumable below par level.Escalate to the lead anesthetist or procurement lead on the same day, and to the clinical director if the shortage lasts more than one day.
Staff reporting more than the agreed number of consecutive long shifts or on call hours.Escalate to the rota lead within the week, and to the clinical director of surgery when the same staff exceed the limit twice in a month.
Operating lists overrunning by more than the agreed margin, or cancellations without a recorded reason.Escalate to the theatre manager when overruns occur on three or more days in a row, and to the clinical director if cancellations rise for a month.

Contingency arrangements

If a serious event occurs, such as a retained item, a major hemorrhage with low stock or a cluster of deteriorating patients, the clinical lead on duty leads the immediate response according to local protocol and calls in senior help. The theatre manager pauses the affected list if safety is in doubt. The blood bank and procurement lead are told at once, and alternative supply routes are used. Patients and families are informed openly, and the incident is reported through the local system for review. Specialist clinical, legal and regulatory advice is sought as the local protocol requires.

Prioritized action plan

  1. Introduce a real structured pause before every incision, with each team member stating patient, site and procedure, owner consultant surgeon lead, within 30 days.
  2. Agree and publish clear escalation triggers for deterioration on the ward and in critical care, owner head of nursing, within 45 days.
  3. Set minimum stock for key blood products and begin a second source for critical sterile items, owner lead anesthetist and procurement lead, within 30 days.
  4. Limit consecutive long shifts and on call hours, and refresh competency sign off for named procedures, owner clinical director of surgery, within 90 days.
  5. Review access rights to clinical records and test the downtime pack, owner information governance lead, within 60 days.

Conclusion

Safe surgery depends on a small set of steady habits: a real pause before every incision, counts that are recorded and not just spoken, early escalation on the ward, rested teams, secure records and reliable stock of critical items. The highest scores sit with deterioration, fatigue and hemorrhage, and each has controls that lower the residual score. Treat the register as a living record, review it on the stated cycle, and seek qualified clinical and regulatory advice before changing any local practice.

Assumptions and limitations

Assumptions

  • The service is a hospital with operating rooms, a surgical ward, a critical care unit and a trauma receiving pathway, all under one clinical governance structure.
  • Staff are qualified clinicians and support workers who practice under professional codes and local protocols.
  • Jurisdiction and health regulator are not specified, so legal duties are described only in general terms.
  • Patient records are held electronically, and most supplies come through a central store and a small number of external suppliers.

Limitations

  • The scores are illustrative and do not describe any real service, patient group or hospital.
  • Clinical practice, surgical technique and regulation vary and change over time, so specialist clinical and regulatory review is needed before any local use.
  • This is educational content and does not replace a formal site-specific risk assessment or licensed clinical advice.

Related frameworks to study

  • Hierarchy of controls for ranking mitigations from strongest to weakest
  • Structured surgical safety checklist used before, during and after operations
  • Clinical governance and incident learning cycle
  • Human factors and structured team communication tools
  • Business continuity planning for critical services
  • Confidentiality, integrity and availability principles for clinical records

Healthcare Risk Assessment

China, India, United States, Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Brazil, Bangladesh, Russia, Japan, Mexico, Philippines, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, South Korea, Australia, Spain.

For Learning Reference Only: This assessment demonstrates how risk assessment principles are applied in a practical setting, providing a useful reference for learning and understanding. Actual assessments may be adapted to suit specific site conditions and circumstances.

Keep learning

Study the subject behind this assessment.

More Healthcare risk assessments

Hourly Active: 45,552 Learners