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Electrical Power Systems Engineering Risk Assessment: Faults, Protection and Maintenance Controls

A worked example of how an engineering team finds, scores and controls the risks in a power system, from arc flash and protection faults to ageing plant, specification mismatch and supplier delays.

Updated November 2026 8 hazards assessed Review every 6 months Highest risk: Critical to High
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Executive summary

This assessment shows how an engineering team can find, rate and control the risks in a medium voltage power system and its substation. Eight hazards were chosen because they are plausible in design, operation and maintenance work. Arc flash during switching is the most severe, with an inherent score at the top of the Critical band, because the energy released can injure people and destroy equipment in a moment. Protection miscoordination, ageing transformers and switchgear, specification mismatch, supplier delays for spares, maintenance deviations, oil and gas leaks, and control data errors fill the rest of the register. Each risk is scored before controls and again after existing and added controls. Most risks fall to Medium or Low once added controls are in place, but arc flash remains High because its consequences stay severe. The first actions are a verified isolation procedure, a protection settings review, a critical spares agreement and a dated check of the as built drawings. The scores illustrate method only.

Focus area
Electrical power systems engineering
Setting
Design, operation and maintenance of a medium voltage distribution network and substation serving an industrial site
Method
Likelihood and severity risk register with inherent and residual scoring

Scope

This assessment covers the design, commissioning, operation and maintenance of an electrical distribution system for a small industrial site, including a medium voltage incoming supply, a substation with switchgear and transformers, protection relays, low voltage distribution and the control systems that monitor them. It does not cover generation, grid transmission or any real installation. Voltage level, jurisdiction, plant age and supplier arrangements are assumptions made for teaching.

Context

The site has a grid connection at medium voltage, a main substation with two incoming feeders and a bus section, two power transformers, metal enclosed switchgear, protection relays with settings files, a standby generator and a supervisory control system. An in-house electrical engineering team designs changes and manages specifications, while a contractor carries out routine testing and maintenance under a permit to work system. Equipment comes from several suppliers with varying lead times. Each hazard is scored before controls to show its natural level, then again after existing controls and the additional controls that should be added.

Objectives, assets and stakeholders

The objective is to supply power safely and reliably, protect people and equipment, meet the legal duties that apply to the network, and keep the plant available for the process it serves. The assets in scope are the incoming supply, switchgear, transformers, cables, protection relays and their settings, the control and monitoring system, standby generation and the records that describe the plant. Stakeholders include operations and maintenance staff, contractors, the engineering design team, the site manager, production users, the network operator, insurers and regulators. Each risk has one owner role, and the engineering manager keeps the register current and reports to site leadership each quarter.

Risk matrix: before and after controls

Each cell shows hazard numbers placed by likelihood and impact. Compare the two grids to see how controls move each hazard.

Before controls

Inherent risk

Risk before controls: rows are likelihood from almost certain to rare, columns are impact from insignificant to catastrophic. Cells list hazard numbers.
1
Insignificant
2
Minor
3
Moderate
4
Major
5
Catastrophic
5 Almost certain
4 Likely Likelihood 4, impact 3, score 12, high: H05 Likelihood 4, impact 5, score 20, critical: H01
3 Possible Likelihood 3, impact 3, score 9, medium: H04 Likelihood 3, impact 4, score 12, high: H02 H03 Likelihood 3, impact 5, score 15, high: H06
2 Unlikely Likelihood 2, impact 4, score 8, medium: H07 H08
1 Rare

After controls

Residual risk

Risk after controls: rows are likelihood from almost certain to rare, columns are impact from insignificant to catastrophic. Cells list hazard numbers.
1
Insignificant
2
Minor
3
Moderate
4
Major
5
Catastrophic
5 Almost certain
4 Likely
3 Possible Likelihood 3, impact 2, score 6, medium: H05
2 Unlikely Likelihood 2, impact 2, score 4, low: H04 H07 Likelihood 2, impact 3, score 6, medium: H02 H03 Likelihood 2, impact 4, score 8, medium: H06 Likelihood 2, impact 5, score 10, high: H01
1 Rare Likelihood 1, impact 4, score 4, low: H08
  • Low 1 to 4
  • Medium 5 to 9
  • High 10 to 16
  • Critical 17 to 25

Hazard register

A summary first, then the detail for each hazard.

Summary of hazards with scores before and after controls
No.HazardBeforeAfterOwner
H01 Arc flash and electric shock during switching or testing 20 Critical 10 High Electrical safety lead
H02 Protection miscoordination and failure to clear faults 12 High 6 Medium Protection engineer
H03 Ageing transformer and switchgear failure 12 High 6 Medium Maintenance lead
H04 Specification mismatch between design and installed plant 9 Medium 4 Low Engineering manager
H05 Supplier delay or failure for critical spares 12 High 6 Medium Procurement manager
H06 Maintenance deviation and permit failure 15 High 8 Medium Maintenance lead
H07 Oil, gas or refrigerant release from electrical equipment 8 Medium 4 Low Environmental officer
H08 Control system and monitoring data errors 8 Medium 4 Low Control systems engineer
H01

Arc flash and electric shock during switching or testing

Safety Before 20 After 10

An arc fault or contact with live parts occurs during switching, testing or fault finding, because isolation is incomplete, a panel is opened in error or the energy available is underestimated.

Who or what is affected: Operators, electricians, contractors and visitors

Causes

Incomplete isolation, unclear labelling and pressure to restore supply quickly.

Consequences

Severe burns, electrocution, death, damage to switchgear and loss of supply.

Existing controls

  • Switchgear has interlocks and labelled circuits.
  • Electricians must hold a current competence record before live work.

Control gaps

Isolation checks rely on memory, and labels have not been updated since the last change to the network.

Additional controls

  • Prevent: Use a verified isolation and earthing procedure with a written permit for every switching task.
  • Detect: Check incident energy labels against the current fault level before any panel is opened.
Likelihood 4 x impact 5 before; 2 x 5 after Owner: Electrical safety lead Target: Within 30 days Early warning: Switching or work on energized equipment without a completed isolation certificate.
H02

Protection miscoordination and failure to clear faults

Operational Before 12 After 6

Relay settings no longer match the network after a change, so a fault trips too much load, trips too slowly or does not trip at all, and damage spreads along the system.

Who or what is affected: Production staff, equipment and the network operator

Causes

Network changes made without a study, out of date settings files and load growth.

Consequences

Wider outages, equipment damage, longer fault duration and unsafe conditions.

Existing controls

  • Relays are set from a documented settings file.
  • Protection is tested during each commissioning.

Control gaps

Settings are not compared with the as built network after changes are made.

Additional controls

  • Prevent: Run a protection coordination study whenever the network or the connected load changes.
  • Respond: Restrict the affected feeder and apply temporary settings only after engineering approval.
Likelihood 3 x impact 4 before; 2 x 3 after Owner: Protection engineer Target: Within 60 days Early warning: Protection relay setting changes made without a second check or a logged reason.
H03

Ageing transformer and switchgear failure

Operational Before 12 After 6

Insulation, bushings, contacts and oil degrade with age and heat, so a transformer or circuit breaker fails in service with little or no warning and cannot be restored quickly.

Who or what is affected: Operators, maintenance staff and users of the supply

Causes

Age, overloading, heat, moisture and missed maintenance.

Consequences

Unplanned outage, fire risk, oil release and long repair time.

Existing controls

  • Periodic visual inspection and thermal imaging are carried out.
  • Breaker operation counts are logged on each unit.

Control gaps

Condition data is collected but not trended against alert limits.

Additional controls

  • Prevent: Plan replacement at end of life using condition data and a documented risk review.
  • Detect: Trend oil, temperature and partial discharge readings and set alert levels for each unit.
Likelihood 3 x impact 4 before; 2 x 3 after Owner: Maintenance lead Target: Within 90 days Early warning: Transformer oil temperature, gas readings or leak alarms outside the normal band.
H04

Specification mismatch between design and installed plant

Operational Before 9 After 4

Equipment is bought to a specification that does not match the fault level, voltage, environment or connected loads, or drawings no longer match what was actually installed.

Who or what is affected: Engineering design team, procurement, installers and users

Causes

Rushed procurement, poor handover and drawings that are not updated.

Consequences

Equipment overstressed, nuisance trips, rework and delayed energization.

Existing controls

  • Designs are checked by a senior engineer before issue.
  • Equipment is inspected against the purchase order on delivery.

Control gaps

The checklist is not used for substitutions made late in a project.

Additional controls

  • Prevent: Use a specification checklist covering fault level, environment, insulation and duty for each item.
  • Detect: Reconcile as built drawings with the installed plant after every change.
Likelihood 3 x impact 3 before; 2 x 2 after Owner: Engineering manager Target: Within 60 days Early warning: A substitution or late change to equipment without a revised specification.
H05

Supplier delay or failure for critical spares

Supplier Before 12 After 6

A single supplier cannot deliver transformers, breakers or relays within the outage limit, or the supplier fails, so a fault that could be repaired in days becomes a long outage.

Who or what is affected: Operations, production users and the supply chain team

Causes

Long lead times, sole sources and competing demand for components.

Consequences

Extended outage, production loss and emergency buying at high cost.

Existing controls

  • Preferred suppliers are listed with their delivery terms.
  • Major orders are placed with a written delivery date.

Control gaps

The spares list is not reviewed against the outage limit each year.

Additional controls

  • Prevent: Qualify a second supplier for critical spares and agree lead times in writing.
  • Respond: Hold key spares on site and arrange hire of temporary plant for emergencies.
Likelihood 4 x impact 3 before; 3 x 2 after Owner: Procurement manager Target: Within 90 days Early warning: Critical spares below minimum stock or with a lead time longer than the outage limit.
H06

Maintenance deviation and permit failure

People Before 15 After 8

Maintenance is done from memory, a permit is not used or a step is skipped, so isolation, testing or reinstatement is wrong and a fault is left in the system.

Who or what is affected: Contractors, maintenance staff and operators

Causes

Time pressure, unclear instructions, poor handover and weak supervision.

Consequences

Injury, equipment damage, repeated faults and loss of supply.

Existing controls

  • A permit to work system is required for planned maintenance.
  • Contractors are inducted before starting site work.

Control gaps

Permit checks are done on paper and are not audited against the work actually carried out.

Additional controls

  • Prevent: Use a written task card for each maintenance job with a sign off at each step.
  • Respond: Stop work and make the plant safe whenever a deviation is found, then record it for review.
Likelihood 3 x impact 5 before; 2 x 4 after Owner: Maintenance lead Target: Within 45 days Early warning: Permits closed without a recorded test result or with a missing signature.
H07

Oil, gas or refrigerant release from electrical equipment

Environmental Before 8 After 4

Transformer oil leaks, insulating gas is released during maintenance or a fire suppression system discharges, polluting ground or water and harming staff nearby.

Who or what is affected: Staff, neighbours, the local environment and the site

Causes

Seal ageing, damage during works and poor handling of gas.

Consequences

Ground contamination, regulatory action, clean up costs and harm to staff.

Existing controls

  • Bunded transformer plinths collect oil.
  • Gas handling is done by trained staff using recovery equipment.

Control gaps

Containment is not tested, and the gas inventory records are incomplete.

Additional controls

  • Prevent: Inspect seals and gaskets on each transformer and record any drip or weep.
  • Detect: Fit level alarms to oil containment and check them at every site visit.
Likelihood 2 x impact 4 before; 2 x 2 after Owner: Environmental officer Target: Within 45 days Early warning: Oil level drop or leak alarm reported at a transformer.
H08

Control system and monitoring data errors

Technology and data Before 8 After 4

Supervisory control or monitoring software shows wrong readings, accepts unauthorized commands or loses alarms, so operators act on false information about the state of the network.

Who or what is affected: Operators, control room staff and maintenance teams

Causes

Software faults, unpatched systems, shared passwords and sensor drift.

Consequences

Wrong switching, missed alarms, unsafe operation and unplanned outage.

Existing controls

  • Operator commands require a log in with role based access.
  • Alarms are reviewed at each shift handover.

Control gaps

Sensor calibration is not checked against readings from local field meters.

Additional controls

  • Prevent: Restrict control rights to named roles and review access each quarter.
  • Recover: Keep a tested backup of the control configuration and a manual switching procedure.
Likelihood 2 x impact 4 before; 1 x 4 after Owner: Control systems engineer Target: Within 60 days Early warning: Alarm list shows unexpected gaps, or readings that do not match a local meter.

Rating method and evaluation

Each hazard is rated on two five-point scales. Likelihood runs from 1, rare, to 5, almost certain, and severity runs from 1, negligible, to 5, catastrophic. Severity considers harm to people first, then damage to plant, loss of supply, environmental effects and cost. Multiplying the two gives a score from 1 to 25, which falls into one of four bands: Low from 1 to 4, Medium from 5 to 9, High from 10 to 16 and Critical from 17 to 25. Inherent risk is the score before any controls, judged as if the existing controls were absent. Residual risk is the score after existing controls and the additional controls in the plan are in place. A residual score can never be higher than the inherent score, and any hazard that starts at 10 or more must show a lower residual score. Critical risks need immediate action and senior sign off before work continues. High risks need a dated plan approved by the engineering manager. Medium risks need routine controls with a named owner. Low risks are accepted and watched. Ratings are challenged by the people who do the work, by a second engineer who was not involved in the design, and by a review after any incident, near miss or failed test. A rating that cannot be justified with evidence is raised until it can be.

Likelihood, impact and rating bands

Likelihood

  • 5 Almost certain: Expected to happen in most circumstances.
  • 4 Likely: Will probably happen in many circumstances.
  • 3 Possible: Could happen at some time.
  • 2 Unlikely: Not expected, but it could happen.
  • 1 Rare: Only in exceptional circumstances.

Impact

  • 1 Insignificant: No lasting effect. Handled within routine work.
  • 2 Minor: Small effect that is quickly corrected.
  • 3 Moderate: Noticeable effect that needs managed effort to correct.
  • 4 Major: Serious effect on people, delivery or reputation.
  • 5 Catastrophic: Severe or lasting effect that threatens the whole activity.

Bands (likelihood x impact)

  • Low (1 to 4): Accept and monitor.
  • Medium (5 to 9): Manage with routine controls.
  • High (10 to 16): Senior attention and a treatment plan.
  • Critical (17 to 25): Act first. Do not proceed until reduced.

Monitoring, escalation and review

Review this assessment every 6 months, and sooner when an indicator below reaches its threshold.

Early-warning indicators and escalation thresholds
Indicator to watchEscalate when
Switching or work on energized equipment without a completed isolation certificate.Stop the work and escalate to the electrical safety lead at once, and to the site manager if it happens again within a month.
Protection relay setting changes made without a second check or a logged reason.Escalate to the protection engineer within one working day, and hold the change until it is verified.
Transformer oil temperature, gas readings or leak alarms outside the normal band.Escalate to the maintenance lead when a reading passes the alert level, and to the engineering manager if it stays out of band for 48 hours.
Critical spares below the agreed minimum stock or with a lead time longer than the outage limit.Escalate to the procurement manager when stock falls below the minimum, and to the site manager if no replenishment order is placed within 5 days.
Maintenance tasks overdue by more than 14 days on switchgear, transformers or protection.Escalate to the maintenance lead after 14 days, and to the engineering manager after 30 days.

Contingency arrangements

If an arc flash, insulation failure or loss of a transformer occurs, the operator isolates the affected section using the approved procedure, makes the area safe and calls the emergency response team. The duty authority is informed, and the engineering manager decides on any restart only after inspection and testing by a competent person. Standby generation is started where it is safe to do so, and critical loads are shed in the agreed order. Spares are drawn from the store, and a temporary supply plan is agreed with the network operator. Injured people receive first aid and medical care, and the incident is reported and investigated under the site procedure.

Prioritized action plan

  1. Introduce a verified isolation and earthing procedure with a written permit for every switching task, owner electrical safety lead, within 30 days.
  2. Review protection settings against the current single line diagram and run a coordination study, owner protection engineer, within 60 days.
  3. Agree a critical spares list with two suppliers and hold key items on site, owner procurement manager, within 90 days.
  4. Reconcile as built drawings and specifications with the installed plant, owner engineering manager, within 60 days.
  5. Set up an oil and gas leak check and an alarm route for transformer containment, owner maintenance lead, within 45 days.

Conclusion

Safe and reliable power depends on a few disciplined habits: verified isolation before any work, settings that are reviewed and tested, specifications checked against the real plant, spares that can be delivered on time and records that match the plant as built. The highest score sits with arc flash, and each hazard has actions that bring the residual score down. Treat the register as a living record, review it on the stated cycle, and seek qualified engineering and legal advice before any real design, change or regulated work.

Assumptions and limitations

Assumptions

  • The system operates at medium voltage with low voltage distribution downstream, and voltage levels are assumed rather than specified.
  • Plant is of mixed age and has a current single line diagram and a protection settings record.
  • Jurisdiction is not specified, so legal duties are described in general terms and must be confirmed locally.
  • Maintenance is partly outsourced to a contractor working under a written permit to work system.

Limitations

  • The scores are teaching examples and do not describe any real network, substation or site.
  • Electrical design, protection and high voltage work are regulated fields, so specialist review is needed before any change.
  • This content is educational and does not replace a formal site-specific risk assessment, a fault level study or licensed engineering advice.

Related frameworks to study

  • Hierarchy of controls
  • Failure mode and effects analysis
  • Bow tie risk analysis
  • Lockout and tagging procedure for isolation
  • Protection coordination study

Technical Risk Assessment

China, India, United States, Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Brazil, Bangladesh, Russia, Japan, Mexico, Philippines, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, South Korea, Australia, Spain.

For Learning Reference Only: This assessment demonstrates how risk assessment principles are applied in a practical setting, providing a useful reference for learning and understanding. Actual assessments may be adapted to suit specific site conditions and circumstances.

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